

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

January 6, 1961

Dear Allen:

I refer to the Joint Study Group Report (December 15, 1960) and the 43 recommendations made therein. Having considered the Group's report I believe that initial affirmative action should be taken immediately on all recommendations as they stand, except Nos. 5 and 18.

On recommendation No. 5, I propose that it be modified to place CIA in direct charge of all clandestine collection operations abroad. The military Services should retain capability for war-time employment by placing their clandestine personnel in CIA bases under CIA direction but concentrating upon targets set by military commanders.

At present, clandestine operations are being mounted by all three military Services and the CIA. When complete coordination is not achieved situations have developed embarrassing to the United States and often with serious consequences to our foreign policy. I believe that a single coordinated effort will, to a great degree, eliminate these difficulties.

I have discussed recommendation No. 18 with my Security Advisor. We would like an opportunity to study the problem in some detail before I will be prepared to offer my recommendation on this subject.

I take this opportunity to express my disagreement with one passage in the text as distinct from the recommendations. On page 17 there is a remark that "the Foreign Service still shows an indifference to intelligence." The fact is, of course, that all reporting Foreign Service Officers are engaged in intelligence, and are anything but indifferent to this aspect of their work. It is also true that the focus of this work is largely the Bureaus of our Department rather than the intelligence community, and it may be for this reason

that the Study

The Honorable  
Allen Dulles,  
Director of Central Intelligence,  
Washington.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

that the Study Group, concentrating as it did on community affairs, felt some absence of relationship. I am, however, convinced that in respect of the community's interests, our Foreign Service Officers have increasingly developed an awareness of their responsibilities, to an extent which belies the unqualified statement in the report. I further feel that the authors of the report in using the word "intelligence" had in mind certain highly specialized forms such as research or closely held operations which could not by their nature concern the generality of Foreign Service Officers. I regret that these distinctions were not brought out by proper qualifications of the statement.

In general, I am happy to say that the report, which I have carefully read, seems to me accurate and a notable contribution to improving our intelligence efforts. Despite my couple of reservations, the Group is heartily to be congratulated.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,



Christian A. Herter

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( 40 )